Explanation

Why Statoblast uses OpenOracle

Statoblast needs a fresh REP/ETH exchange rate (quoted as REP per ETH) when it measures whether REP adequately secures ETH obligations. OpenOracle supplies an economically contestable price. A reporter posts a WETH/REP position at the claimed price, and anyone who believes the price is wrong can replace the report by trading against that position, so an inaccurate report is a profit opportunity. OpenOracle never decides whether a prediction-market answer is Yes, No, or Invalid.

Protected operations

A shared portfolio feed protects commitment growth, surplus REP withdrawals, purchases and takeovers. The question coordinator is an adapter to that feed. Each capital or settlement operation still checks its own live safety conditions. Reporter deposits use separate REP custody.

Cached and fresh prices

An accepted report supplies a shared price for a limited freshness window. A sponsor can fund a new independent candidate when it expires. Child universes need their own accepted reports; a copied numeric price is not fresh evidence.

One request, dispute, and settlement

Alice wants to increase her commitment while the shared REP/ETH price is stale. She funds an independent report. Bob can trade against an inaccurate report before it settles; a dispute restarts its settlement clock. Once a valid report settles and is accepted, Alice submits her capital change with explicit bounds. A sponsor can instead attach an ordered batch of capital operations, such as several takeovers or a commitment change followed by a withdrawal. Acceptance attempts those operations under the sponsor’s authority in the same transaction, even when someone else submits settlement.

A multi-question portfolio shares one accepted price but allows independent reports at the same time. Each report has its own funding escrow, so a disputed report cannot hold another sponsor’s released funds. Capital operations can also execute separately once a valid shared price is available. A report-bound batch gets ordered attempts, not a reservation: another independently funded report may settle first. Each operation has its own gas allowance and safety checks; one failure leaves the accepted price usable and does not block later operations. The total gas budget, rather than a fixed operation count, limits the batch. Growing underwriting also requires enough challenged report funding; a settled larger report can support an owner’s entry even after a smaller renewal, while retaining that report’s conservative collateral requirement for the owner. The shared coverage reference gives the exact limits.

Security limitations

OpenOracle relies on participants noticing and profitably correcting inaccurate reports. Congestion, censorship, incorrect gas assumptions, insufficient economic incentives, or repeated disputes can delay or undermine that process. A fresh price is not a guarantee that an operation will succeed, and a settled price says nothing about the market question's outcome.

Portfolios constrain capital growth by challenged report funding, but this does not guarantee an accurate price. The oracle does not impose an absolute deadline on a report game: each valid dispute restarts its settlement clock. Independent candidates can proceed independently when another report remains disputed; their acceptance still depends on a correction opportunity and timely settlement.

Each report is sized from a gas-cost assumption. The priority fee in that assumption is fixed when the origin pool is created and inherited by its children; it is not observed from the request block. If prevailing priority fees are higher, the modeled incentive for a disputer is weaker; a value set too high raises the sponsor's initial WETH and REP requirement and can make requests impractical.

The OpenOracle integration reference specifies funding formulas, report sizing, sponsor rules, callbacks, recovery paths, configuration, and a report-sizing calculator. The security model states the participation assumptions.